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ABSTRACT
Balancing a duty to a tribunal and a duty to a client can
paralyze a lawyer. The task raises difficult questions about how to
reconcile competing obligations as an advocate and as an officer of
the court. Individuals licensed to prosecute patent applications
must decide how to honor both their obligations to the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) and their obligation to successfully
prosecute patent applications. This burden can result in willful
blindness, where the patent attorney or patent agent (“patent
practitioner”) limits inquiry into information that may bar a patent
application. The recent Federal Circuit opinion in Therasense may
have eliminated the judicial “duty to inquire” doctrine that kept
these obligations in balance. This Issue Brief argues that there is a
need to protect against willful blindness and proposes a
resurrection of the eliminated doctrines.

INTRODUCTION
Prior to Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,1 individuals
licensed to prosecute applications on behalf of inventors—patent
practitioners2—had an affirmative “duty to inquire” into information
relevant to the prosecution of a patent.3 This duty barred patent practitioners
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649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
2
This Issue Brief refers to patent attorneys and patent agents collectively as “patent
practitioners.” See 37 C.F.R. § 11.6 (2012) (defining “patent attorney” and “patent
agent”).
3
Brasseler, U.S.A. I.L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1382 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
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from willfully ignoring information deemed “material.”4 In Therasense,
however, the Federal Circuit left the enforcement of this duty in peril by
holding that there was no inequitable conduct even though the patent
practitioner “should have known” of the materiality of undisclosed
information.5
The enforcement of the duty to inquire should survive Therasense.
Without such enforcement, patent practitioners are unlikely to fully inquire
into potentially material information to avoid finding information that may
harm the client’s or the attorney’s interests and make it difficult to balance
existing ethical obligations to the PTO and the client. A thorough inquiry,
however, is in the public’s interest. To encourage inquiry, courts should
ensure that patent practitioners cannot avoid a finding of inequitable
conduct by willfully blinding themselves to material facts. Two doctrinal
avenues are open: Courts may either hold that willful blindness constitutes
knowledge of the materiality of the undisclosed information, or they may
carve out an exception for egregious actions to avoid knowledge. Either
way, it is imperative to adopt a doctrinal innovation that will encourage
inquiry after Therasense.

I. THERASENSE ELIMINATED THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE DUTY TO
INQUIRE
The Federal Circuit’s en banc opinion in Therasense heightened the
standards needed to establish inequitable conduct. In Therasense, the patent
holder omitted information by not disclosing to an examiner at the PTO that
statements presented in prosecuting the patent in dispute were contradictory
to statements made in prosecuting the patent’s European counterpart.6
Individuals commit inequitable conduct if they “misrepresent[] or omit[]
material information . . . with the specific intent to deceive the PTO.”7
“Inequitable conduct is an equitable defense to patent infringement that, if
proved, bars enforcement of a patent.”8 Prior to Therasense¸ courts had
4

Id. at 1380 (“Where an applicant knows of information the materiality of which
may so readily be determined, he or she cannot intentionally avoid learning of its
materiality.”).
5
See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (“A finding that the misrepresentation or
omission amounts to gross negligence or negligence under a ‘should have known’
standard does not satisfy this [specific] intent requirement [of inequitable
conduct].” (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d
867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988))).
6
Id. at 1318.
7
Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(citing Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 557 F.3d 1357, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2008)).
8
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1285.
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“embraced . . . reduced standards for intent and materiality to foster full
disclosure to the PTO.”9 In Therasense, the Federal Circuit observed that
although “honesty at the PTO is essential,” these reduced standards had led
to “overuse[]” of inequitable conduct.10
In response, the Federal Circuit altered the standard for materiality.
Before Therasense, the Federal Circuit’s definition of materiality tracked
the PTO’s evolving definition of materiality.11 In Therasense, however, the
court defined a “but-for materiality” standard, under which information is
material if the PTO would not have allowed the claim but for the
inequitable conduct.12
The court also heightened the standard for intent. The court held
that the “absence of a good faith explanation for failing to disclose” or a
finding that a patent practitioner “should have known” and reported
undisclosed information was no longer sufficient for a finding of intent to
deceive the PTO.13 Under the new intent standard for omitted information,
an “accused infringer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
applicant knew of the reference, knew that it was material, and made a
deliberate decision to withhold it.”14 The court also divorced the
relationship between intent and materiality by holding that stronger
evidence of one would not redeem weaknesses in proving the other.15
The en banc opinion in Therasense did not address whether a duty
to inquire survived the heightened standard for intent—perhaps because the
duty to inquire was not implicated in the facts of Therasense. In
Therasense, there was an inconsistency in the position taken by the
9

Id. at 1288 (explaining that the court had previously found inequitable conduct
based on “gross negligence” or a “broad view of materiality,” and had allowed
weaknesses in proof of materiality if there was strong evidence of intent and vice
versa).
10
Id. at 1290 (explaining that “low standards for intent and materiality have
inadvertently led to many unintended consequences, among them, increased
adjudication cost and complexity, reduced likelihood of settlement, burdened
courts, strained PTO resources, increased PTO backlog, and impaired patent
quality”).
11
See id. at 1288 (explaining that “[t]ying the materiality standard for inequitable
conduct to PTO rules, which understandably change from time to time, has led to
uncertainty and inconsistency in the development of the inequitable conduct
doctrine” (citing Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309,
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2006))).
12
Id. at 1291–92 (reasoning that there is no “unfair benefit” without “but-for
materiality”).
13
Id.
14
Id at 1290.
15
Id.
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applicant in front of the US and European PTOs.16 Prior to the en banc
opinion, a panel of the Federal Circuit held that the attorneys did not violate
a duty to inquire because the “record [did] not show, and no party ha[d]
argued that [the attorneys] were on notice, at the time of the withholding” of
this inconsistency.17
While the en banc Therasense court did not explicitly address the
duty to inquire, the opinion disincentivizes patent practitioners from seeking
out material information. By heightening the knowledge component of the
intent requirement, the Federal Circuit in Therasense removed sanctions for
avoiding knowledge. After Therasense, the patent practitioner who does not
inquire will not have actual knowledge of material information, which may
not satisfy the new, heightened standard for inequitable conduct. At the
same time, the court permitted penalties for having knowledge of material
information. An inquiring patent practitioner risks finding information that
may bar the practitioner from prosecuting a patent application. If the
practitioner does not reveal this discovered information and the patent
issues, she faces a finding of inequitable conduct. Further, the practitioner
who inquires must reconcile ethical responsibilities to her client and to the
PTO. The change in penalties and ethical complexities associated with
inquiring make it unlikely a practitioner will inquire without an enforced
duty.

A. The Federal Circuit Likely Eliminated Sanctions for Avoiding
Knowledge
The PTO and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board may place
sanctions on practitioners who advocate positions without fully inquiring
into the factual information underlying those positions. Under the PTO’s
regulations, before “signing, filing, submitting, or . . . advocating . . . any
paper” before the USPTO, individuals involved with filing and prosecuting
a patent application have a duty to engage in “inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances” that “allegations and other factual contentions have
evidentiary support or . . . are likely to have evidentiary support” and
“denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence, or … are
reasonable based on a lack of information.”18 This rule is based on Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.19

16

Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289, 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2010), rev’d en banc, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
17
Id.
18
37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b) (2012).
19
Linda K. McLeod & Stephanie H. Bald, Ethical Issues in U.S. Trademark
Prosecution and Practice, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 365, 379 (2010).
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Despite these available sanctions, the PTO does not “proactively
pursue” practitioners’ failure to inquire. In 1988, the PTO “abandoned” any
practice of finding fraud and inequitable conduct during the pendency of an
application, “leaving issues of fraud or inequitable conduct to the courts.”20
Currently, the PTO generally imposes sanctions only in response to the
“few cases” brought by the public to the Office of Enrollment and
Discipline (OED)21 and “final court determinations.”22 A court’s finding of
inequitable conduct can result in the PTO taking “disciplinary action”
against the patent practitioner.23
The PTO itself recognizes that the threat of these sanctions is
insufficient to encourage practitioners to inquire into material information
and disclose adverse information. In arguing in an amicus brief against
changing the standards for both materiality and intent, the PTO claimed that
“[t]he prospect of agency disciplinary action for disclosure violations is
unrealistic . . . because the Office is required by statute to file any charges
within five years . . . and it seldom learns of inequitable conduct within that
period of time. In addition, the PTO . . . rarely has access to relevant facts
regarding inequitable conduct, because it lacks investigative resources.”24
The recent changes under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act25
(AIA) seem unlikely to encourage the PTO to begin enforcing the duty to
inquire. Under the AIA changes, after a patent has issued, an individual in a
supplemental examination can expose withheld information in hopes that
20

6 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03(6); see also Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1306
(Bryson, J. dissenting) (“[T]he PTO has concluded that a court is the best forum in
which to consider alleged breaches of the disclosure duty in the context of an
inequitable conduct defense.”).
21
About OED, OFFICE OF ENROLLMENT AND DISCIPLINE (Jan. 3, 2013, 11:26 AM),
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/oed/news/index.jsp (explaining that among the
many responsibilities of the OED is “investigat[ing] allegations of misconduct by
practitioners”).
22
Scott A. McKeown, USPTO Required to Police Fraud Under H.R. 1249?,
OBLON, SPIVAK, MCCLELLAND, MAIER & NEUSTADT, L.L.P. (Apr. 20, 2011),
http://www.patentspostgrant.com/lang/en/2011/04/uspto-fraud-squad.
23
See 6 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03(6)(j) (explaining that a patent practitioner
may be subject to “disciplinary action” for violating the “duty of candor” to the
PTO); see also 35 U.S.C. § 32 (2012) (explaining when the PTO can suspend or
exclude a patent practitioner).
24
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1305–06 (Bryson, J. dissenting); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2462 (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or
proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or
otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the
date when the claim first accrued.”).
25
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35
U.S.C.).
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the PTO will not find the withheld information material, thereby avoiding
sanction for inequitable conduct. Although the patent practitioner still risks
sanctions through the PTO,26 “[t]he USPTO has made clear that the agency
is ill-suited to pursue investigations into inequitable conduct due to a lack of
resources, [and] subpoena power.”27 Therefore, it seems unlikely that this
new provision under the AIA will dramatically encourage the PTO to
investigate into the circumstances of withholding the information.
Under the supplemental examination provision, it also seems
unlikely that a practitioner who has ignored material information and
received a patent without PTO detection of this material information will
suddenly seek out this information and disclose it to the patent office. First,
supplemental examination is available only to the patent owner,28 so the
attorney would have to have his client institute this process, which seems
unlikely given that the material information could still invalidate the claims
of the patent. Second, the patent practitioner still faces possible PTO
sanctions.29 Third, supplemental examination is unavailable once a patent
owner has notice of a pleading in civil court related to a patent.30 Therefore,
once the patent practitioner knows this patent will be analyzed by the
courts, the practitioner and client have no PTO escape.
Prior to Therasense, inequitable conduct provided a way for courts
to sanction and thereby enforce the duty to inquire, with the litigants paying
for the investigation. Where a patent practitioner “should have known that
the withheld reference would be material to the PTO’s consideration, the
failure to disclose the reference [was] sufficient proof of the existence of an
intent to mislead the PTO.”31 Where a patent practitioner “avoid[ed] actual
knowledge” the “‘should have known’ factor be[came] operative.”32 As the
Federal Circuit explained in Brasseler, U.S.A. I.L.P. v. Stryker Sales

26

See 35 U.S.C. § 257(f)(2) (2012) (“Nothing in this section [on supplemental
examination] shall be construed . . . to limit the authority of the Director to
investigate issues of possible misconduct and impose sanctions for misconduct in
connection with matters or proceedings before the Office.”).
27
McKeown, supra note 22.
28
35 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2012) (“A patent owner may request supplemental
examination of a patent . . . .”).
29
35 U.S.C. § 257(f)(2) (2012).
30
35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(2)(A) (2012) (“[Supplemental examination] shall not apply to
an allegation pled with particularity in a civil action.”).
31
Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Kansas Jack, Inc.
v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
32
See FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc. 836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(explaining that avoiding actual knowledge may take the form of “cultivat[ing]
ignorance, or disregard[ing] numerous warnings that material information or prior
art may exist”).
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Corp.,33 the duty to learn of potential information that requires disclosure
arose under two circumstances: (1) where the patent practitioner was “on
notice of the likelihood that specific, relevant, material information exists
and should be disclosed;” and (2) where the patent attorney was aware of
information which “suggests the existence of specific information” that may
be material and “ascertained with reasonable inquiry.”34
After Therasense, establishing an intent to withhold omitted
material information requires proof by “clear and convincing evidence” that
(1) the person “knew” of the undisclosed reference, (2) “knew” of its
materiality, and (3) made a “deliberate decision to withhold” the material
information.35 Since the judicial standard now requires actual knowledge, it
seems that a failure to inquire is no longer sufficient for a finding of an
intent to deceive the PTO. The PTO itself does not appear poised to enforce
a duty to inquire. Therefore, the threat of inequitable conduct appears to be
moribund, removing a powerful sanction for practitioners who avoid
learning of material information.

B. The Costs of Inquiring, Without the Possibility of Sanction,
Discourage Learning of Material Information
Despite Therasense, patent practitioners continue to have a duty to
inquire under the PTO’s regulations.36 The high costs of complying with the
duty, however, will encourage patent practitioners to narrowly construe
what this duty entails. Patent practitioners face an immediate personal cost
if they embark on an inquiry and discover information that could bar a
patent application. In Brasseler, for example, the patent attorneys knew of
prior sales of an invention, but did not investigate whether the date of such
sales barred a patent application for the invention.37 Had the attorneys
inquired, however, they would have been unable to file the application,
potentially losing income from this work.
The current financing model for patent prosecution further
incentivizes willful blindness in the absence of an enforced duty to inquire.
“Over the past few decades, patent practitioners have developed . . . the use
of flat fees, contingent fees and royalties.”38 In the case of flat fees, patent
practitioners earn money based on work product, and a patent practitioner
33

267 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1382.
35
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co, 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (en banc).
36
37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b)(2) (2012).
37
Brasseler, 267 F.3d at 1383.
38
Kenneth R. Shurtz. How Far Should the PTO Regulate Business Relationships of
Patent Practitioners?, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 169, 186 (2009).
34
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that wants to earn more money is incentivized to file and prosecute even
meritless applications to produce more work product in the form of patent
applications and office actions. In the case of contingent fees and royalties,
a patent practitioner still has an incentive to push through meritless patent
application because any payment under these financial arrangements comes
from an issued patent, not a patent practitioner’s opinion that the application
is not patentable.
A practitioner concerned with the interests of the client also faces
costs to the client for inquiring. Judge Bryson, dissenting in Therasense,
went so far as to argue that even if the patent practitioner finds material
information, she likely would not disclose it due to the costs to the client’s
interests.39 It is in the best interest of the client to avoid immediate
invalidation from disclosure of material information during prosecution and
risk unenforceability in litigation for inequitable conduct.40 Bryson noted
that no matter how faithful the practitioner is to PTO obligations, even “an
open door may tempt a saint.”41
However, the client’s interests after discovering material
information are not as clear at Judge Bryson alleges. A finding of
inequitable conduct, described by the Federal Circuit as the “‘atomic bomb’
of patent law,”42 creates substantial costs of its own. Inequitable conduct in
regards to a “single claim renders an entire patent unenforceable”43 and “can
spread from a single patent to render unenforceable other related patents
and applications.”44 Further, a finding of inequitable conduct “may also
spawn antitrust and unfair competition claims,” justify an award of
attorneys’ fees, or provide an “exception to attorney–client privilege.”45 The
attorney also personally faces the possibility of disciplinary action for a

39

Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1305–06 (Byson, J. dissenting) (“[T]here will be no
inducement for the applicant to be forthcoming. If the applicant withholds prior art
or misleadingly discloses particular matters and succeeds, he obtains a patent that
would not have issued otherwise. Even if the nondisclosure or misleading
disclosure is later discovered, under the majority's rule the applicant is no worse
off, as the patent will be lost only if the claims would otherwise be held invalid.”).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 1288 (quoting Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d
1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting)).
43
Id. (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877
(Fed. Cir. 1988)).
44
Id.
45
Id. at 1289.
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finding of inequitable conduct as explained above, not to mention
reputational damage.46
More likely, the patent practitioner will not inquire at all, to
preserve the interests of both client and attorney. The practitioner has little
expectation of sanctions for avoiding knowledge and avoids the risk of
discovering material information. Discovering material information has
several associated costs, including possible concession of the patentability
of an application or risking a finding of inequitable conduct if the
practitioner does not concede. Under this enforcement structure, patent
practitioners are “encourage[d] or even require[d] . . . to engage in riskier
behavior” to prevent knowledge of material information that might subject
them to a finding of inequitable conduct.47

C. Avoiding Knowledge Reconciles Ethical Responsibilities to the
Practitioner’s Client and the PTO
In May of 2013, new rules went into effect regarding patent
practitioners’ professional obligations to the PTO.48 The purpose of the
revisions was to align the PTO Code of Professional Responsibility with the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association.49
However, even under the new rules, a patent practitioner still faces
conflicting ethical responsibilities and is encouraged to avoid knowledge of
material information. A patent practitioner has duties of loyalty and
advocacy to her client. At the same time, however, the patent practitioner
must reconcile these duties to the client with duties of truthfulness to the
PTO,50 and must “make inquiry reasonable under the circumstances” into
contentions made to the PTO.51 The easiest way to do this is to avoid
inquiring into material information that may result in information that the
practitioner is ethically obligated to reveal, but that may injure the
practitioner’s obligations to the client. For example, the patent practitioner
46

Katherine E. White, “There’s a Hole in the Bucket:” The Effective Elimination of
the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 716, 719
(2012) (“[I]nequitable conduct charges damage a patent attorney’s reputation as a
bad actor.”).
47
Jason Rantanen and Lee Petherbridge, Therasense v. Becton Dickinson: A First
Impression, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 226, 254 (2012).
48
Changes to Representation of Others Before The United States Patent and
Trademark Office, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER (Apr. 3, 2013)
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/04/03/2013-07382/changes-torepresentation-of-others-before-the-united-states-patent-and-trademark-office.
49
USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct, OFFICE OF ENROLLMENT AND DISCIPLINE
(July. 17, 2013, 1:44 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/oed/ethics.jsp.
50
37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2012).
51
37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b) (2012).
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may not ask about prior sales or unnamed inventors. This is especially
problematic going forward under the changes in the legal landscape brought
about by the America Invents Act (AIA), where uncertainty remains on
statutory application bars. For example, a patent practitioner prosecuting an
application post-AIA may not inquire about secret commercial uses because
it is not clear whether such secret uses, especially pre-AIA, will bar an
application.52
Often patent practitioners are patent attorneys with additional
expectations and ethical responsibilities not expressly incorporated into the
professional obligations required of all patent practitioners before the PTO.
The PTO currently reports an approximate 1:3 ratio of active patent agents
to active patent attorneys.53 Attorneys serve as advocates, and “[a]s an
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of
the adversary system.”54 It is difficult for an attorney to advocate with
information that endangers her client’s case before the PTO because the
duty of candor55 requires the attorney to poison the application by revealing
this information.
The PTO has underscored the duty of the patent practitioner to
poison the application by adding Rule 11.106 as part of the May 2013 PTO
Code of Professional Responsibility revisions. Rule 11.106 prioritizes
disclosure to the PTO by stating, “A practitioner shall disclose to the Office
information necessary to comply with applicable duty of disclosure
provisions.”56
It is easy to advocate without possessing all relevant information in
patent prosecution, when it is unlikely that the patent attorney will be
surprised by revealed material information. Under an “adversarial system
. . . advocacy for two opposing parties will eventually illuminate the
truth.”57 However, during prosecution, the patent practitioner principally
faces an examiner who reviews the patent application to make sure the
application conforms to statutory requirements for patent applications.58 The
52

Dennis Crouch and Jason Rantanen, Did the AIA Eliminate Secret Prior Art?
(Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/did-the-aia-eliminatesecret-prior-art.html.
53
Patent Attorneys/Agents Search…, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Aug.
26, 2013, 4:45 PM), https://oedci.uspto.gov/OEDCI/query.jsp (citing 10,749 active
agents and 31,213 active attorneys).
54
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble (2012).
55
37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2012).
56
37 C.F.R. § 11.106 (2013).
57
Joe Kelly, The Genesis Of Corruption In Criminal Lawyers, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 591, 601 (2012).
58
The AIA changes may make patent prosecution more adversarial by allowing
increased opportunities for third parties to show the PTO material information
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examiner has no interest in disallowing the patent application. Rather, the
examiner is incentivized to allow the patent application because the PTO
only generates revenue for allowances.59 Further, an examiner can
maximize the credit the examiner receives though a quick allowance under
the new examiner count system, which rewards the examiner less and less
the longer the examiner reviews the application.60 The length of time the
examiner reviews a rejected application is driven by the applicant who
responds to office actions and makes requests for continued examination.
An examiner can end this review through allowance. Further, the large
backlog of patent applications confronting the typical patent examiner is
itself an incentive to quickly dispose of patent applications. In 2011, the
PTO reported a backlog of more than 1.2 million pending utility patent
applications.61 Allowances obviate lengthy examiner reviews of an
application, allowing the examiner to begin reviewing a new application
and earn additional credit.
In patent prosecution, there is only one advocate, the patent
practitioner, who wields great control over the facts presented. The patent
attorney’s advocacy is limited by duties to the PTO. Under Rule 11.303
under the PTO Rules of Professional Conduct, “[a] practitioner shall not
knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the
tribunal by the practitioner.”62 Tribunals include the PTO,63 so when the
patent attorney initially files the patent application with the PTO, the
attorney is within the reach of this rule. If the PTO rejects a patent
application, the application faces several levels of tribunal review including
including Post Grant Review. However, this process is based on the European
Patent Office procedure, under which on average only 5 percent of granted patents
are opposed. See Susan J. Marsnik, Will The America Invents Act Post-Grant
review Improve the Quality of Patents? A Comparison with the European Patent
Office Opposition., UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS ETHICS AND BUS. LAW FACULTY
PUBL’NS 2, 6 (Sept. 24, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2151444.
59
Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s
Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2062 (2009)
(“[U]nder the current fee structure, a large percentage of the front-end examination
cost is recouped through back-end issuance fees as well as maintenance fees, which
are considerably higher than front-end filing fees . . . . Not only do applicants who
secure and maintain patents dramatically subsidize those whose patents are denied,
but the current fee structure also sets up an obvious financial incentive for the PTO
to grant patents.”).
60
Gene Quinn, USPTO’s New Examiner Count System Go into Effect,
IPWATCHDOG, (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/02/26/usptosnew-examiner-count-system-go-into-effect/id=9310/.
61
Marsnik, supra note 58, at 4.
62
37 C.F.R § 11.303 (2013).
63
37 C.F.R § 11.1 (2013).
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the Patent Trial and Appeal Board and the Federal Circuit. Litigated patents
face district court tribunals and possibly appeals of this court’s decision.
The patent attorney acting as an advocate will want to achieve successful
patent applications on the client’s behalf. The attorney’s duties to the
tribunal however, will prevent false statements, so the easiest way—indeed,
perhaps the only way—for the patent attorney to satisfy both duties is to
intentionally avoid learning material information that may bar a patent
application and thereby falsify the attorney’s statement that the subject
matter of the patent application is patentable.
Similarly, Rule 11.304 of the PTO Rules of Professional Conduct
declares that “a practitioner shall not . . . unlawfully obstruct another party’s
access to evidence or unlawfully . . . conceal a document or other material
having potential evidentiary value.”64 To prevent concealing or obstructing
information to the PTO or third parties opposing an application, the attorney
is forced to engage in willful blindness to continue to advocate for the
client.
A patent practitioner faces risks to his own and his client’s interests
when inquiring into material information that may bar patentability, and is
further encouraged by existing ethical obligations to severely limit inquiry.
Therefore, the recent Federal Circuit’s change in standards to prevent
meritless inequitable conduct claims likely sacrificed adherence to the duty
to inquire.

II. THE DUTY TO INQUIRE SERVES A USEFUL PURPOSE
Preserving the duty to inquire provides valuable public benefit,
guides the patent practitioners through vague or underenforced ethical
duties, and reconciles Federal Circuit and Supreme Court precedent.

A. The Duty to Inquire Serves the Public Interest
The duty to inquire helps ensure the quality of patents and lowers
the likelihood of granting a monopoly on information already in the public
domain. The “scope of the patent claims” defines the “boundary of a patent
monopoly.”65 Knowledge of material information may drive the
modification of claims to carve out a narrower area not already in the public
domain. Patents are invalid if the scope of the claims covers material
already in the public domain,66 and can be invalidated in litigation if a
challenger shows that the claims fall short of the statutory requirements for
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patentability.67 If the patent is not invalidated, however, the public is
harmed when an invention the public had understood to be in the public
domain is removed and put under a monopoly.
Further, uncovering material information after the patent
practitioner files the application imposes costs on the PTO, competitors, and
the public. The change in standards required in Therasense will shift the
burden of determining if a patent meets statutory requirements to the PTO
because it “reduce[s] the care and patent quality responsibilities [of]
applicants.”68 If the PTO does not discover this information and issues the
patent, society pays a cost through reduced competition, thus allowing the
monopoly patent-holder to set the prices for products at a higher price.69
Professors Jason Rantanen and Lee Petherbridge postulate that patentlitigation costs will go up because Therasense will increase the proportion
of low-quality patents that are likely to be invalidated in litigation, and
competitors will likely spend more money to litigate a patent if they can
invalidate it.70
These costs—the cost to the PTO of analyzing the patents, the cost
to the public of honoring the patent holder’s monopoly, and the cost to
competitors of litigating the patent—could be avoided if the patent
practitioner initially screened inventions for patentability before pursuing a
patent. Rantanen and Petherbridge contend that patent practitioners and
applicants are best situated to ensure that patents meet the statutory
requirements because often the information is at the “applicant’s fingertips”
and the PTO does not have the necessary “resources to ensure that only
deserving inventions receive patents.”71 The duty to inquire forces the
patent practitioner to find information that may help in this initial screening
without shifting the burden to the PTO.
Even if the patent practitioner finds information that may not bar
patentability, federal regulation provides that “[t]he public interest is best
served, and the most effective patent examination occurs when, at the time
an application is being examined, the [PTO] is aware of and evaluates the
teachings of all information material to patentability.”72 It is difficult for the
PTO to be aware of all material information without the help of the patent
67

See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 2239–40 (2011)
(“[Microsoft] sought a declaration that the patent was invalid under § 102(b)’s onsale bar, which precludes patent protection for any ‘invention’ that was ‘on sale in
this country’ more than one year prior to the filing of a patent application.”).
68
Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 47, at 239.
69
Id. at 243.
70
See id. at 245 (postulating that the change in Therasense will produce more “lowquality patents” and “competitor[s] will resist liability more vigorously”).
71
Id. at 239.
72
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012).
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practitioner in inquiring and supplying that information. For example, if an
inventor kept his process out of the public domain but commercially
produced for sale a product of this process for over a year, his
patent application should be barred.73 However, the PTO may never learn of
this activity without the inquiry of the patent practitioner and subsequent
disclosure.
If the material information never surfaces, the patent owner holds a
monopoly in violation of statutes carefully crafted to “draw[] a line between
the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive
patent, and those which are not.”74 Without the duty to inquire, the public’s
interest suffers from improper monopolies.

B. Patent Practitioners Need Clear Guidance with Enforcement not
Provided by Existing Ethical Duties
Even in the absence of a duty to inquire enforced through penalties
for inequitable conduct, patent practitioners still have ethical considerations
that may discourage willful blindness. A single patent attorney may have
ethical considerations as an attorney,75 an engineer,76 and an agent of the
PTO.77 However, when these guidelines are explored, it becomes apparent
that they are vague and unenforceable guidelines that do not limit an
attorney’s role as an advocate. In contrast, under the pre-Therasense duty to
inquire, a patent practitioner had guidance on when to inquire—and
enforcement through sanctions derived from a finding of inequitable
conduct.78 A court-defined and enforced standard for the duty to inquire is
73

See ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(explaining that “where a patented method is kept secret and remains secret after a
sale of the unpatented product of the method[, s]uch a sale prior to the critical date
is a bar if engaged in by the patentee or patent applicant” (quoting In re Caveney,
761 F.2d 671, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).
74
See Graham v. John Deere Co. 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (quoting Thomas Jefferson,
Letter to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
175, 180–181 (H.A. Washington ed., Washington, D.C., Taylor & Maury 1854))
(explaining the purpose of the patent monopoly). Jefferson, notably, was also the
author of the 1793 Patent Act.
75
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2012) (requiring
attorneys not engage “knowingly” in “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation”).
76
See, e.g., NAT’L SOC’Y OF ENGINEERS, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ENGINEERS, Rule
II.3 (2007), available at http://www.nspe.org/resources/pdfs/Ethics/CodeofEthics/
Code-2007-July.pdf (requiring licensed professional engineers to “be objective and
truthful in professional reports, statements, or testimony”).
77
See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012) (requiring PTO agents and attorneys to
disclose information “material to patentability”).
78
See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
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still needed to ensure that patent practitioners fulfill all ethical obligations
and disclose information needed by the PTO.
1. PTO ethical duties impose guidelines without enforcement
The PTO requires that “[e]ach individual associated with the filing
and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and good faith
in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the [PTO] all
information known to that individual to be material to patentability.”79 This
requirement burdens the patent practitioner with revealing information, but
does not require the practitioner to actively acquire information. Without a
duty to inquire, the fact that both the applicant and the patent practitioner
have a duty to disclose information is insufficient to ensure that the PTO
has all the information necessary to decide on an application. Even if the
applicant has the information and the inventor also owes a duty of candor to
the PTO, the inventor may not have the training to know what information
is material to patentability until prompted by the attorney. In this situation,
the duty to inquire guides a useful exchange of information that provides the
material information the PTO needs.
To aid in a patent practitioner’s “duty of disclosure,” the Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) provides helpful suggestions for what
an attorney should inquire into, such as “possible public uses and sales.”80
These suggestions indicate that the duty to disclose has implications for
inquiry and that willful blindness will not satisfy the ethical responsibilities
of the patent practitioner to disclose material information to the PTO. Once
again, there is no mechanism to ensure that these duties are honored.81 The
court-defined duty of inquiry, however, did enforce very similar duties, and
did so effectively. For example, in Brasseler, the court noted that it is not
inequitable conduct for an attorney to rely on information disclosed by the
client unless there is reason to doubt this information, and cited the
suggested questions set forth in MPEP § 2004.82 By protecting attorneys
following the suggestions of the MPEP, the court enforced these
suggestions by the PTO. If the court-defined duty of inquiry disappears,
however, so does enforcement of the PTO’s duty of inquiry.
2. Attorney ethical duties impose vague, uncertain guidelines
79

37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2012) (emphasis added).
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
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See id. (explaining that “it is not appropriate to attempt to set forth procedures by
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of disclosure”).
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(Fed. Cir. 2001).
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Patent practitioners that are also attorneys have an ethical duty
under Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to not
“knowingly assist or induce another to violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct.”83 “Knowingly” denotes “actual knowledge” but such “knowledge
may be inferred.”84 If either the practitioner or the applicant violates the
Rules of Professional Conduct, the practitioner is ethically responsible. It is
“professional misconduct” to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”85 or “engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”86 Choosing not to inquire may
allow an inference of knowledge of the materiality of the reference under
this rule. Willful blindness may evidence dishonest behavior, or submitting
an incomplete record of potentially material information may misrepresent
the scope of material information. It is more likely that willful blindness is
prejudicial to the administration of justice, because it can result in the
issuing of a patent that unjustly takes useful inventions out of the public
domain or prevents subsequent inventors from claiming these inventions.
These are unfair results to the public or to the inventor, and contrary to the
statutory scheme devised by Congress in granting patents.
In the end, however, Rule 8.4 is vague at best for patent attorneys,
and instructs only what an attorney should not do. Incorporating Rule 8.4
into the May 2013 revisions to the PTO Rules of Professional Conduct by
adding Rule 11.804 did little to clarify what a patent practitioner should
do.87 Neither Rule 8.4 nor Rule 11.804 defines unethical behavior with the
determinacy to stand against the tide of incentives to avoid learning of
material information. A clearly defined duty—with corresponding judicial
enforcement—is needed.
3. Scientific ethical duties suggest that a patent practitioner should not
engage in willful blindness, but lack clear guidelines
Many patent practitioners also have scientific backgrounds, with
associated ethical guidelines. For example, out of the thirty-two approved
Bachelor’s degrees to qualify as a patent agent or attorney, eighteen are
engineering majors.88 The National Society of Engineers has developed its
83
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MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2012).
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own ethical guidelines89 that are enforced under state authority by civil
penalties for those licensed as “professional engineers.”90 These engineering
rules are relevant in the context of patent prosecution because they were
developed to protect the professional reputation of the engineers, and
engineers often use their engineering training in developing and prosecuting
patent applications.
These guidelines direct patent practitioners away from willful
blindness. Under the guidelines, engineers “shall not attempt to injure,
maliciously or falsely, directly or indirectly, the professional reputation,
prospects, practice or employment of other engineers.”91 There is no
requirement here that the engineers violating this rule know that the person
they are injuring is another engineer. If the patent practitioner through
willful blindness allows a patent application to file before another engineerapplicant, and that patent application should not have been filed, the patent
practitioner risks injuring the professional reputation of the inventor he
represents and the prospects or employment of the later engineer-applicant.
Furthermore, patent practitioners bound by engineers’ ethical duties
have enhanced duties to engage in fact finding. For example, the guidelines
provide that “[e]ngineers shall be objective and truthful in professional
reports, statements, or testimony. They shall include all relevant and
pertinent information in such reports.”92 Likely, a patent application would
be viewed as a professional report, as it includes a specification of the
relevant science.93 This duty to include all information indicates that
engineers are expected to seek out and find such relevant information.
Engineers also have affirmative duties to “strive to serve the public
interest.”94 In addition, engineers and attorneys both have duties to avoid
deceptive acts.95 Yet neither the ethical guidelines for engineers nor those
for attorneys provide clarity on how patent practitioners are to avoid
deceptive acts or what constitutes deception.
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NAT’L SOC’Y OF ENGINEERS, supra note 76.
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89C-21(a)(4) & (c) (2013), available at
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Accordingly, although the ethical duties imposed upon engineers
generally align with the responsibility of patent practitioners to inquire, they
do not direct a course of action that would engage in inquiry. Where the
PTO has provided suggestions, these suggestions are not enforced. Without
clear guidelines, practitioners—operating as advocates, concerned about the
potential costs of inquiring—will move further away from learning material
information. Thus, neither PTO rules, attorney ethical standards, nor
engineering ethical standards substitute for the pre-Therasense, judicially
enforced duty to inquire.

C. A Duty to Inquire Reconciles Federal Circuit and Supreme Court
Precedent to Proscribe Willful Blindness in Patent Law
Prior Federal Circuit opinions supported the duty to inquire because
it prohibited “cultivat[ing] ignorance” to avoid actual knowledge.96 Without
the duty to inquire, there is little to encourage a patent practitioner to learn
material information. In Therasense, the Federal Circuit’s expressed goal, in
changing the materiality and knowledge standards, was to limit the amount
of information submitted to the PTO and the number of claims of
inequitable conduct.97 However, honoring a duty to inquire would result in
production of information only if the inquiry resulted in a finding of
materiality. This production of information would expose any validity
issues with the patent well before issuance and inequitable conduct
challenges.
In sacrificing the duty to inquire in exchange for potentially
reducing claims of inequitable conduct, the Federal Circuit has effectively
nullified its case law prohibiting patent practitioners from engaging in
willful blindness. Scholars have further suggested that excluding willful
blindness may even be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s recent
holding in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.98
In Global-Tech, the Supreme Court held that willful blindness could
establish knowledge in the context of patent infringement.99 The Court
identified two elements for determining when willful blindness exists and
establishes knowledge: “(1) the defendant must subjectively believe that
there is a high probability that a fact exists, and (2) the defendant must take
deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.”100 Under this standard,
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See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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some think willful blindness must implicate liability for inequitable
conduct, as well.101
This standard is useful in the context of inequitable conduct for
many of the same policy reasons cited by the Court in Global-Tech. The
Court noted that “defendants who behave in this manner are just as culpable
as those who have actual knowledge”102 and “persons who know enough to
blind themselves to direct proof of critical facts in effect have actual
knowledge of those facts.”103 These statements pertain no less forcefully to
inequitable conduct. Accordingly, the knowledge requirement in the
heightened inequitable conduct standards should be satisfied by or
inferrable from a finding of willful blindness.
The Supreme Court in Global-Tech used broad strokes in applying
willful blindness to patent law. The Court found that willful blindness is
widely accepted in the criminal context and reasoned that these principles
apply in the realm of patent infringement.104 The Court—over a sharp
dissent—allowed no special protection for those “who actively encourage
others to violate patent rights and who take deliberate steps to remain
ignorant of those rights.”105 The Court’s direct application of the criminal
standard of willful blindness to the patent context indicates that carving out
willful blindness from inequitable conduct in patent prosecution may be
inconsistent with the policy announced in Global-Tech Appliances.
That the Global-Tech Appliances standard is applicable to patent
prosecution is further evidenced by the recent district court decision in
Hokto Kinoko Co. v. Concord Farms, Inc.106 In that case, decided after
Therasense, the court ruled that the willful blindness standard announced in
Global-Tech applied to misrepresentations before the PTO where a party
registered a federal trademark for goods to which the party did not affix the
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trademark or intend to affix the trademark.107 Practitioners who file
documents related to trademarks have the same statutory duty to inquire.108
It seems incongruous that practitioners should be subject to stricter
enforcement of this duty for trademark applications, but not for patent
applications.

III. COURTS SHOULD RESURRECT THE DUTY TO INQUIRE
The need for the duty to inquire and the incentive imbalance left in
the wake of Therasense creates a need for some enforceable standard that
prohibits willful blindness. Courts are institutionally well-situated for the
task of defining and enforcing the standard, as willful blindness should be a
fact-bound inquiry elucidated through concrete cases, and adverse litigants
have the best incentive and resources to expose the relevant facts. The best
way to do this is for the Federal Circuit to clarify that willful blindness
remains a viable and enforced doctrine post-Therasense. Alternatively,
courts could directly adopt the new standards proposed in Global-Tech that
currently apply to patent infringement. As a final option, the courts could
create an exception to the current standards for particularly egregious
willful blindness.

A. The Court-defined Duty to Inquire Provides Enforced Guidelines
that Balance a Practitioner’s Responsibilities to the Client and the
PTO
The duty to inquire into potential information that requires
disclosure arises under two circumstances: (1) where the patent attorney is
“on notice of the likelihood that specific, relevant, material information
exists and should be disclosed,” and (2) where the patent attorney is aware
of information which “suggests the existence of specific information” that
may be material and “ascertained with reasonable inquiry.”109 PreTherasense willful blindness doctrine was workable and congruent with a
patent practitioner’s other duties, and the Federal Circuit should affirm that
it remains viable and enforceable post-Therasense.110 Because the attorney
essentially has to have a lead that there was information to find, the attorney
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is not required “to pursue a fishing expedition.”111 This allows the attorney
to advocate without constant suspicion of the client’s patent.
The case law has also drawn a fact-intensive distinction between
willful blindness and mere negligence, limiting the responsibilities of the
patent practitioner in the latter case. The Federal Circuit has recognized
exceptions to the attorney’s duty to inquire when the attorney relies on
information provided by clients112 or on the work of other attorneys.113 This
ensures that the patent practitioner does not face liability for inquiring but
finding incorrect information. It also protects attorney-client trust by
allowing the patent practitioner to rely on the client.
Finally, the duty to inquire supports the principle described in both
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court precedent that a party who engages in
willful blindness has culpability. The Federal Circuit, by removing “should
have known” as a standard for determining intent, did not expressly
foreclose willful blindness. The Federal Circuit equated “should have
known” with gross negligence or negligence.114 Similarly, the Supreme
Court has said willful blindness does not implicate negligence or reckless
intent.115 Therefore, an interpretation of Therasense that aligns with Federal
Circuit and Supreme Court case law must preserve the possibility of finding
inequitable conduct for willful blindness.

B. Courts Can Resurrect the Duty to Inquire by Finding that Failing
to Inquire Constitutes Knowledge
A practitioner’s failure to inquire could rise to the heightened level
of knowledge required for intent to deceive after Therasense. If the patent
attorney is “on notice” of material information,116 this may constitute
sufficient knowledge of at least the materiality of the reference to satisfy the
heightened-knowledge component of intent to deceive the PTO necessary to
find inequitable conduct. Alternatively, when a patent practitioner is aware
of information which “suggests” material information and the practitioner
111
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can easily review this information,117 this may be sufficient to infer
knowledge, because a patent practitioner who has a duty to inquire should
look. Such a holding would be supported by the reasoning of Global-Tech
Appliances: “[P]ersons who know enough to blind themselves to direct
proof of critical facts in effect have actual knowledge of those facts.”118
Yet another alternative, if the duty to inquire alone is insufficient to
define a standard of behavior that supports the heightened knowledge
component of intent after Therasense, is for courts to directly adopt the
two-prong analysis in Global-Tech Appliances, finding knowledge when (1)
the patent practitioner subjectively believes that there is a high probability
that material information exists, and (2) the patent practitioner takes
deliberate actions to avoid learning of this material information.119
Unfortunately, this test, like many of the other ethical duties imposed on
patent practitioners, illuminates what not to do as opposed to what to do.
Still, adopting this test would provide some disincentives for engaging in
willful blindness by providing sanctions for this behavior.

C. Alternatively, Courts Can Recognize an Exception to the
Heightened Inequitable Conduct Standard
Currently, the Federal Circuit recognizes an exception to the but-for
materiality requirement where there is evidence of an affirmative act of
“egregious misconduct.”120 While there is currently no judicially recognized
exception to the specific intent requirement, the benefits of preventing
willful blindness and maintaining ethical obligations may suggest that
courts could apply the egregious misconduct doctrine in such
circumstances.
In Therasense, the court found that a person would not engage in
egregious conduct unless she felt that it would affect issuance of the patent
application. From this behavior, the court could infer that the patent would
not have issued with the disclosure. Similarly, courts could view willful
117
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blindness as constituting egregious behavior, and infer not only knowledge
of the materiality but a specific intent to deceive the PTO.
The court in Therasense does not foreclose the possibility that an
intent exception could exist. The court says “[b]ecause direct evidence of
deceptive intent is rare, a district court may infer intent from indirect and
circumstantial evidence,”121 where the intent to deceive is “the single most
reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence.”122

CONCLUSION
The recent Therasense opinion likely hindered enforcement of the
duty to inquire into information that could potentially bar a patent
application. Without enforcement, patent practitioners have little incentive
to protect the public interest in disclosure. Thus, the duty to inquire is
needed both to prevent willful blindness, which harms the public interest,
and to the support ethical duties of the practitioner as an attorney, scientist,
or agent of the PTO. Judicial enforcement of the duty to inquire will
buttress Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent. Several solutions to
resurrect the duty to inquire are possible, including introducing the standard
that a lack of inquiry constitutes knowledge, adopting alternative willful
blindness standards, and creating an exception to the current heightened
standard for intent to deceive the PTO. The Federal Circuit’s policies to
prevent patent practitioners from cultivating ignorance must be enforced
through some mechanism or such policies will be ignored.
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